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THE INDETERMINACY OF HISTORICAL
EVIDENCE
SUZANNA SHERRY*

I view my task in this Article to be proving that history is indeterminate. The rest of the Articles from this Panel may discuss
what to do about the indeterminacy. I would like to put aside the
normative questions and a number of empirical questions, including the question that Larry Alexander raised last night about
whose intent we are examining. Rather, I would like to attempt
an historical or originalist analysis of some interesting and controversial contemporary constitutional questions.
There is a recent case that raises quite a few of these controversial questions. The case is Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of
Virginia,' in which a religious student organization challenged
the University of Virginia's refusal to provide the organization's
newspaper with the financial support that the university offers
other nonreligious student publications. 2 The University of Virginia's original defense, which it subsequently abandoned, was
that the Establishment Clause prohibits a state university from
funding any religious publication.3 This case raises interesting
questions about freedom of speech, the Establishment Clause,
and other constitutional provisions.
Imagine that you were clerking last Term for a Supreme Court
Justice who happens to be a very strict originalist. The Justice instructs you to research how the Framers would have answered the
various questions raised by Rosenberger.Because you are not a professional historian and have limited time, you decide to examine
the conclusions of scholars who have carefully studied the
history.
First, the case raises a question of jurisdiction. Because the
University of Virginia is a state entity, the Eleventh Amendment
may prohibit this suit. The Eleventh Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
* Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil liberties Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
2. See Rosenberge, 115 S. Ct. at 2516.
3. See id. at 2516.
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against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The text of the Eleventh Amendment does not mention suits commenced against a
State by a citizen of that State. Does the Eleventh Amendment
bar the students' action because the students are citizens of the
Commonwealth of Virginia? The historical authorities provide an
equivocal response.
Two scholars who have conducted careful historical research
have reached contradictory conclusions. Calvin Massey has concluded that the State should be immune from suit.4 William
Fletcher, however, has concluded that the State should not be
immune.5 They are only two of most prominent scholars who
have studied the Eleventh Amendment question. Other scholars
are also divided in their opinions.'
Assuming, in the absence of conclusive historical evidence,
that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the suit, you must
reexamine a previously settled question in light of the Framers'
intent. This question is whether the First Amendment applies to
the States. As a matter of original intent, does the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporate the Bill of Rights?
Returning to the library, you find that scholars are again in
conflict. On the basis of a careful examination of the historical
sources, Michael Kent Curtis has concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to incorporate most of the first ten
amendments. 7 Another respected scholar, Charles Fairman,
reached the opposite conclusion after examining some of the
same historical sources considered by Curtis.'
4. See Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L REv. 61 (1989).
5. See William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Constructionof an Affirmative GrantofJurisdictionRather than a ProhibitionAgainstJurisdiction,
35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983).
6. Proponents of the "diversity theory" advanced by Fletcher argue that the Eleventh
Amendment bars federal jurisdiction only in cases in which that jurisdiction is based
solely upon the status of the parties. See, e.g., Akhil &. Amar, Of Soveregnty and Federalism,
96 YALE .]. 1425, 1473-519 (1987); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLUM. L REv. 1889 (1983); Vicki C.Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YAmE LJ. 1 (1988).
Other scholars have challenged this theory as inconsistent with both the text and history
of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, Fightingthe Words of the Ele.
enthAmendmen 102 HAv. L. REv. 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, TheDiversity Theory of
the Eleventh Amendment: A CriticalEvaluation, 102 HtARv. L. REV. 1372 (1989).
7. See MicHAEL K. Curirs, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FoURTEF.rH AMENDMENT AND
THE Bn.L OF RIGHTS (1986).
8. See Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
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Because the historical evidence on incorporation is not helpful, you begin to examine the substantive issues. One of the substantive issues that the University of Virginia has dropped is the
Establishment Clause question. Does the Establishment Clause
prohibit the University of Virginia from funding a religious student organization?
This question raises two distinct issues. The first issue is
whether a State may aid religion if it does not discriminate
among religions. A number of scholars interpret the Establishment Clause to prohibit only discriminatory aid to particular religions.9 Does this interpretation, known as nonpreferentialism,
reflect the intent of the Framers?
Another search through the library yields the same equivocal
answer. Robert Cord supports nonpreferentialism, arguing that
the Framers intended to prohibit only government discrimination among religions. 10 Douglas Laycock, however, has argued
1
that the Framers intended to prohibit aid to religion generally.
Attempting to define "aid to religion" would make this issue even
more complicated.
The second aspect of the Establishment Clause question is the
issue of coercion. Scholars dispute whether the Establishment
Clause forbids government aid to religion that is not used to coerce anyone into subscribing to a particular religion, attending
particular religious services, or aiding religion in any way.
Michael McConnell has argued that coercion is a necessary element; there is no violation of the Establishment Clause unless
someone is subject to government coercion. 1 2 Douglas Laycock,
however, has argued that coercion is not a necessary element;
government aid to religion may violate the Establishment Clause
9. See, e.g., McHAEL J. MALBin, RELGION AND PoLrIcs: TE INTENTIONS OF THE AuTHORS O THE FiRsr AMENMmENT (1978); Edwin Meese, Toward aJuriprudenceof Original
Intention, 2 BENcHMAm 1, 5 (1986); Rodney K Smith, Getting Off On the Wrong Foot and
Back On Again: A Reexamination of the Histoy of the Framingof the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment and Critiqueof the Reynolds and Everson Deisions 20 WAxE FOREST L. REv. 569
(1984).
10. See ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURMCAND STATE: IhSroiucAL FACT AND GuRnRENr FICrION (1982); Robert L Cord, Church-State Separation:Restoring the "No-Preference"
Doctrine of the FirstAmendment, 9 HAv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 129 (1986).
11. See Douglas Laycock, The Originsof the Religion Clauses of the Constitution: "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 875
(1986).
12, See Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. &
MAvL Rav. 933 (1986).
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even if it involves no coercion." Again, these two scholars have
reached opposite conclusions based on careful historical analysis,
often of the same historical evidence.
Finally, the students may argue that they have an unenumerated fundamental right to the University funding. This claim implicates the Ninth Amendment, but differing interpretations of
the Ninth Amendment provide another example of the difficulty
in determining original intent. The Ninth Amendment says,
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Although speakers have mentioned this provision several
times in preceding Panels, none of the panelists has examined its
original meaning. However, a number of articles address this
question. In fact, both Tom McAffee and I have written in the
area, and we disagree completely. Tom McAffee has argued that
the Ninth Amendment does not create any judicially enforceable
unenumerated rights.' 4 I have suggested, relying upon much of
the same historical evidence considered by Professor McAffee,
that the Framers did intend to protect judicially enforceable
unenumerated rights under the Ninth Amendment.' 5
Even this brief analysis ofjust this one case thus demonstrates
the indeterminacy of original intent. For each issue examined,
careful historical analysis of the same evidence may yield opposite conclusions. Unfortunately for proponents of originalism,
there are similar disputes about any issue worth taking to the
Supreme Court, including affirmative action, privacy, and criminal procedure. Indeed, similar disputes exist over almost any
constitutional issue.
Yesterday, Raoul Berger mentioned one question about which
there seems to be very little debate. He suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to address voting.
Although some of today's earlier panelists might dissent, there
appears to be a general consensus on this question. One reason
for this consensus is that the historical evidence includes the Fifteenth Amendment, which directly addresses voting. The Fifteenth Amendment remedies the omission of voting from the
13. See Douglas Laycock, "Noncoercive" Support for Religion: Another False Claim About the
Establishment Clause, 26 VAt.. U. L.REv. 37 (1991).
14. See Thomas B. McAffee, The OriginalMeaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 1215 (1990).
15. See Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment: Rightingan Unwritten Constitution,64 CmKENT L. Rev. 1001 (1989).
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express terms of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus makes
moot the question whether the Fourteenth Amendment applies
to voting. 6 The problem with originalism is that it cannot resolve
an active controversy; it provides answers only where original intent has become irrelevant to the resolution of the question.
I offer in closing one final point. You may have noticed that all
of the scholars that I have mentioned this morning are either law
professors or political scientists. Why have I not discussed any
professional historians who do not teach in law schools? The answer is that professional historians do not attempt to answer the
questions which I have raised, because they recognize that history
is indeterminate. Perhaps we should follow their wise example.

16. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.") with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 ("But
when the right to vote in any election... is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State ... the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.").
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